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Abstract 
 
The decline of Putin's Russia into a more militarised state with an aggressive and 
revisionist foreign policy has prompted politicians, scholars, and soldiers to discuss 
whether there is a risk of Russian "hybrid war" or overt military strike against e.g. 
one of the three Baltic states. Two opposing views are apparent. Some note that 
NATO's combined economies and military capabilities dwarf Russia's by a factor of 
about twenty to one, and conclude that Russia thus is no threat at all to any part of 
NATO. Others, including hyper-nationalist Russian strategists, suggest that the 
balance of forces in Northern Europe favours Russia, and that Putin consider or 
should consider a strike against e.g. the Baltic states. The conflict between the two 
views of NATO's conventional capabilities and deterrence in Northern Europe has 
inspired this contribution, which updates Cold War era methods for assessing the 
military balance, and seeks a pattern in the findings. 
 
When estimating military capabilities the mere accounting of numbers of personnel 
and main equipment says very little. A military capability requires not only the 
merging of workable materiel with trained personnel but also with relevant command 
structures and a logistical framework. Furthermore, the depth of the logistical 
framework, which includes stores and spares, a supply chain, and fieldable 
maintenance and repair facilities is both essential and very difficult to assess. The 
same can be said for the training level of the capabilities and their overarching 
commands and underlying logistics; and in cases where the capability is expected to 
be expeditionary its ability to deploy it must be factored in. 
 
During the Cold War the comparison of Soviet and NATO conventional strength was 
a key issue to which much discussion was devoted, but the assessments were largely 
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done inside narrow circles of soldiers of scholars with privileged access to 
intelligence. While the interest in the estimation of Mechanised Division Equivalents 
waned after the Cold War, earlier insights and methods are still available and can be 
used for similar pursuits today (see e.g. International Security vol. 12:4, 1988). 
Moreover, a significant change in public access to military estimates has recently 
occurred. The Internet now provides access to satellite imagery and searchable 
official and unofficial defence related databases, sites and discussions, which 
supplement commercial and academic resources such as Jane's and The Military 
Balance. With a great many stipulations and a change from divisions to brigades as 
accounting unit Mechanised Brigade Equivalents can thus be estimated country by 
country in Northern Europe (here the countries around the Baltic Sea plus Norway).  
 
Having done this it is found, firstly, that NATO indeed has a significant local 
disadvantage in Northern Europe. Even when its forces are combined Russian 
conventional capabilities are at the very least twice as large in the short to medium 
run. The disadvantage is markedly larger if the Northern European NATO countries' 
logistical shortcomings, lack of collective training, and potential inability to move its 
forces into e.g. the Baltic states are factored in. Secondly, the apparent ability of 
several Northern European states such as Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Poland, 
Lithuania and Latvia to convert their defence spending into military capabilities differ 
by more than an order of magnitude in relation to Russia and in particular to Finland. 
Thirdly, even though the marked variations in force generation effectiveness are not 
explained by a single factor it seems that armed forces manning model explains much 
of the difference. The deficiencies of some manning models may be caused by flaws 
in national defence policy processes, possibly coupled with wide-spread perceptions 
of the armed forces and of military professionalism which unintentionally reduces 
military efficiency. 
 
That there are vast distances between nominal personnel and materiel numbers and 
real capabilities in some countries is not a recent discovery. The 2004 report "A 
European Defence Strategy" by Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri noted that 
"there are 1.7 million Europeans in uniform, but only 170,000 combat soldiers, of 
which only 40-50,000 can be used for robust combat operations at any one time". The 
report suggested that this was caused by "an ever increasing operational tempo" 
coupled with "static or falling personnel numbers and defence budgets" and not the 
least that the ineffective forces were "conscript-based and ... committed to territorial 
defence". In February 2015 report with a similar scope, "More Union in European 
Defence" from the Centre for European Policy Studies, suggested that European 
NATO's lack of operational capabilities were caused by a lack of funding as well as 
"huge inefficiencies, due to duplication of capacities, platforms and systems...". 
Which of the suggested causes, namely cuts, conscription, territorial defence, or 
duplication are really behind the variance in the aforementioned Northern European 
states' ability to generate military capabilities consonant with their defence budgets? 
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Preliminary analyses indicate that some armed forces do not have the right number of 
soldiers of the right age, rank, and training, but generally employ far too many full-
time personnel and maintain militarily ineffective rank and age cohorts. Thus 
inappropriate manning models have led to excessive personnel costs, which have  
reduced procurement, training, maintenance, education, and deployment for decades. 
This to the point where even nominally very large and well-funded armed forces have 
become practically unable to generate and deploy military capabilities beyond 
symbolic contributions. 
 
Further research into this interpretation of the majority of the Northern European 
states' relative inability to generate military forces for both conventional or 
expeditionary use will be required to confirm the underlying causes, and allow for the 
correction of the problems. 
